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Abstract 
The transformation in the nature of war and of accompanying human rights violations have 
influenced the manner in which we think about sovereignty, non-intervention and the 
protection of human rights. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria and the Security 
Council’s response to it has shown that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is heavily 
influenced by factors other than the substantive act of violence. Accordingly, this paper 
discusses the legal element, but also throws light on the factors that influence the use, or 
abstention from the use, of armed humanitarian intervention. Further, in light of recent 
crisis, this paper evaluates the argument of a ‘new humanitarianism’ which may prove to be 
useful in a better understanding of the dynamics of armed conflicts and mass atrocities.  
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“States bent on criminal behavior should know that frontiers are not the absolute defense.” - 
Kofi A. Annan1 
Humanitarian intervention has undoubtedly been one of the remarkable developments of the 
post-Cold War era wherein military force has been used to end human rights violations on 
foreign territories.2 However, humanitarian interventions which began in the 1990s have 
since, remained a contested subject matter under international law.3 Usually, it is expected 
that, both ethical and legal aspects would form part of any humanitarian intervention, but, in 
most cases, the fulfillment of an ulterior motive (strategic or economic interests) is viewed 
hijacking the ‘humanitarian’ nature of interventions. Furthermore, half-hearted attempts to 
intervene amid an international crisis have not averted humanitarian catastrophes but only 
added to it.4 In addition, concerns regarding the legal status of humanitarian interventions 
have also created significant challenges for the global order in terms of formulating a 
consensus as to whether or not international law should permit states to use military force to 
avert human rights abuses. Thus, a major obstacle to the legalization of humanitarian 
interventions is the unlawful use of force by states in order to pursue personal gains under the 
pretext of helping victims.5       
Therefore, it can well be said that, “humanitarian intervention saves lives and costs lives. It 
upholds international law and sometimes breaks international law. It prevents human rights 
violations, and it perpetrates them.”6 As a result, humanitarian missions, in their attempt to 
                                                             
1‘Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly’ (United Nations, 20 September 1999) 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html> accessed 7 March 2017.  
2 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (3rd edn, Polity Press 2016) 9.  
3 Mark S. Stein, Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention (2004) 16 (2) Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, 15. 
4 Graham Cronogue, Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of Humanitarian Intervention 
Post – Libya (2012) 3 (1) Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 124, 126.  
5 Zaid Ali Zaid, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law (2013) 54 (2) Acta Juridica Hungarica, 185, 
186. 
6 David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World (2003) 18 (1) Brigham 
Young University Journal of Public Law, 1, 3.    
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stop human rights abuses, avert crisis and preserve human life; have given rise to a number of 
issues relating to, legality and legitimacy of the interventions, the nature of interventions 
covering different scenarios and the general understanding of the key concepts enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, like, sovereignty, nonintervention in the domestic affairs of 
a state and human rights.7 Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention allows states to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of other states in order to stop human rights violations. Consequently, 
the validity of humanitarian interventions continues to be highly debated among both 
theorists and practitioners of international law.8 This paper attempts to explore the validity of 
the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention in light of an upsurge in ‘violence within 
states’ in the 21st century.  But, before going any further, it is important to define 
humanitarian intervention in order to critically examine the issue at hand. 
 
1. The Traditional Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention  
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is a contentious subject, both in law and in 
international relations.9 Since, certain states are not willing to unanimously accept the 
principle involved; there is no generally accepted definition of the term ‘humanitarian 
intervention’.10 Nonetheless, the term has been defined by many writers. J. L. Holzgrefe 
defines humanitarian intervention, as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state 
(or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission 
of the government of the state within whose territory force is applied.”11 Adam Robert’s 
                                                             
7 ibid. 
8 Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project (2004) 35 (2) 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 259, 260. 
9 Dr. Jasmeet Gulati and Ivan Khosa, Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State Sovereignty (2013) 41 Denver 
Journal of International Law & Policy, 397, 400. 
10 Anne Ryniker, ‘The ICRC position on “humanitarian intervention”’ (International Committee of the Red 
Cross, June 2001), 527 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/527-532_ryniker-ang.pdf> accessed 7 
March 2017. 
11 Dr. Gulati and Khosa, Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State Sovereignty (n 9) 399. 
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defines humanitarian intervention, as “coercive action by one or more states involving the use 
of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of 
preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”12  
Note that, despite the uncertainty around humanitarian intervention, certain states are of the 
view that the doctrine is in the process of being accepted widely and its practice is in the 
process of developing.13 It would be suffice to say that, at present, the doctrine is already 
accepted wherein there is a threat to peace as a result of violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law within a country.14 Regardless of the validity of humanitarian intervention 
in the post-Cold War era, there remains absolutely no doubt that the doctrine gained 
widespread acceptance during the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a customary 
principle of international law.15 The origins of the doctrine can be traced to the seventeenth 
century jurist Hugo Grotius and later in the writings of the eighteenth century jurist Emer de 
Vattel.16 But, it was only at the end of the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, that 
the issue of humanitarian interventions gained considerable importance. During this time, a 
substantial body of state practice arose wherein the great powers justified forceful 
interventions on foreign soil by alleging a need to protect civilians. Therefore, in light of the 
considerable freedom enjoyed by states to resort to armed force during this period, it was 
least surprising that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention gained widespread 
acceptance.17 For instance, as noted by T.C. Lawrence, “an intervention to put a stop to 
                                                             
12 Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, (2000) 3 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law, 3, 5. 
13 Ryniker, ‘The ICRC position on “humanitarian intervention”’ (n 10) 529. 
14 ibid 530. 
15 Gabor Sulyok, Humanitarian Intervention: A Historical and Theoretical Overview (2000) 41 (1-2) Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 79, 86. 
16 ibid 85. - In the case when a breach of a fundamental right is undoubted, said Grotius, no-one can approve of 
it on the basis of equity, and in such cases the “rights of human society” cannot be ruled out. Moreover, even if 
the doctrine that citizens are not allowed to take arms against their sovereign was recognized, it would not mean 
that no-one else could do that for them. It is, he explained with an apt comparison, as if a trustee acted for his 
ward. 
17 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, (2006) 100 (1) The American Journal of 
International Law, 107, 108. 
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barbarous and abominable cruelty is a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of 
law. Should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting that the best instincts of human 
nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to an end and 
removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of the conflict, there is nothing in the law 
of nations which will brand as wrongdoer a group of states which might undertake to 
intervene.”18  
Though, the only resistance faced by the doctrine during this period was on the ground that 
the use of force by states on humanitarian basis stood in violation of the non-intervention 
principle.19 In the post UN era, the legal principles that steered the early development of the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention remain no longer valid mainly because the prohibition 
of the use of force had become a peremptory norm of international law. In addition, 
safeguarding human rights was no longer an issue within the sole domestic jurisdiction of 
individual states but was considered a matter of international concern.20  
Prior to examining the impact of the Charter regime on the humanitarian intervention 
doctrine, it is crucial to have a look at one of the key tenets of international law i.e. state 
sovereignty which presents by far the greatest challenge to the notion of humanitarian 
intervention.  
2. The Concept of State Sovereignty  
Sovereignty has, for the past several centuries, acted as the foundation of international 
relations and world order.21 The concept of sovereignty can be understood as “the 
                                                             
18 Sulyok, Humanitarian Intervention: A Historical and Theoretical Overview (n 15) 87. 
19 Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention (1988) 9 Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies, 333, 
337. - Pradier-Fodere offers a classic statement of the non-intervention rationale for rejecting a right to 
humanitarian intervention when he writes: “The acts of inhumanity, however condemnable they may be, do not 
provide the latter with a basis for lawful intervention, as no state can stand up in judgment of the conduct of 
others. As long as they do not infringe upon the rights of the other powers or of their subjects, they remain the 
sole business of the nationals of the countries where they are committed.” 
20 Celeste Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter of the United 
Nations (2002) 60 (2) University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 1, 6. 
21 Dr. Gulati and Khosa, Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State Sovereignty (n 9) 400. 
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independent and unfettered power of a state in its jurisdiction.”22 Sovereignty as a concept is 
one of the fundamental principles of international law, both under customary international 
law and the UN Charter. It also plays a very significant role in upholding international peace 
and security even as acting as a defense for weak states against an aggression from strong 
ones.23 At the same time, the concept has consistently been violated by powerful states. In a 
globalized world, territorial borders have come under stress due to varied political 
dimensions resulting from internal disorder, social turmoil etc. which have put limits on the 
scope of freedom for states to handle sovereign matters. Powerful states have often seen a 
developing crisis as an opportunity to intervene in the sovereign affairs of a weak state in the 
pretext of preventing a wider international disorder.24   
The current formulation of the concept of sovereignty as per several scholars in international 
law was highly influenced by agreements concluded by European states in the Westphalia 
treaties, 1648. After almost 30 years of war, the sovereign authority was established within a 
system of equal and independent states in order to maintain peace and order.25 It is essential 
to identify the necessary elements of statehood, given that, for an entity to claim sovereign 
authority, it must fulfill the criteria of being a state in the first place.26 The 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States lists out the essential elements of a state: “a 
permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the ability to enter 
into relations with other States.”27 The post-1945 system of international order is laid down in 
the UN Charter. The Charter adopted the principle of sovereign equality amongst all states. 
                                                             
22 G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (n 2) 21. 
23 J. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (1974) 4 California 
Western International Law Journal, 203, 257. - State sovereignty refers to the legal equality, competence and 
independence of states. Within this concept are all matters that all countries are allowed by the international law 
to act without compromising the sovereignty of other nations. Examples of such matters include the social, 
political, economic and cultural systems to be employed by the states. In these important issues, a state has free 
will to choose the way forward for its citizens without cohesion from any other state. 
24 ibid.  
25 Dr. Gulati and Khosa, Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State Sovereignty (n 9) 411. 
26 Zaid, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law (n 5) 187. 
27 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, art 1. 
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Taking into account the critical nature of equality of all states, the Charter sought to prevent 
any interference in the sovereign affairs of one state by another.28 The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, “recognized the sanctity of 
the tenet of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states.”29 In 1949, the Court also 
pointed out that “the respect for territorial sovereignty among states that are independent is an 
essential foundation for international relations.”30 The Court also referred to the principle of 
non-interference as an important principle of state sovereignty which acts as a base for the 
entire international law.31 An act of aggression against the territorial sovereignty of a state is 
considered unlawful, firstly because such acts destabilize the international order and can 
present a threat of war which the UN has sought to outlaw since its inception. Secondly, the 
intentional weakening of a state’s capacity to govern creates a political vacuum which can 
lead to internal disorder, human suffering, threat to the peace and security of the whole 
region, as has been seen in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, Iraq and Afghanistan, or Yemen 
and Syria.32  
Sovereignty is not, however, absolute, because of widely accepted limits in international law. 
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, sovereignty is not a barrier to measures taken by the 
Security Council in order ensure peace and security.33 As per Article 51, the use of force is 
permitted either in self-defense or via a mandate from the Security Council.34 Sovereignty 
                                                             
28 Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations (n 
20). 
29 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), I.C.J. Reports 1949, 4. 
30 ibid 35. 
31 S. G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention (1993) 24 California Western 
International Law Journal, 117, 118. 
32 Rohini Sen, Use of Force and the ‘Humanitarian’ Face of Intervention in the 21st Century (2014) 32 (3) 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 457, 462.  
33Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights (1993) 69 (3) International 
Affairs, 429, 433. 
34 Charter of the United Nations 1945, art 51. - Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
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also yields to the demands of customary law and treaty obligations. Member states under the 
Charter are obligated to fulfill their international obligations to achieve international 
cooperation in addressing economic, social, cultural problems and work towards achieving 
the goals set out in the Charter.35 Sovereignty also carries with it the responsibility for states 
to protect persons and property within their territories. The UN Charter has significantly 
expanded obligations in the field of human rights law thereby regulating political and 
economic affairs of member states. Sovereignty can no longer be used as a shield against 
human rights violations that go against the norms of international law.36 In the words of 
former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “the time of absolute state sovereignty 
has passed.”37 In this respect, in a number of cases in the 1990s, the Security Council 
endorsed the use of military force to protect human rights of individuals/groups. In short, 
sovereignty could no longer be an unquestioned justification for actions that completely 
disregarded human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals/groups.38     
The following section examines the influences of the adoption of the United Nations Charter 
on the humanitarian intervention doctrine.    
 
3. The United Nations Charter and Humanitarian Intervention 
The legal discourse on the use of armed force in international law has changed significantly, 
since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations by the international community.39 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.   
35 Charter of the United Nations 1945, art 2(1). - All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and 
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance 
with the present Charter. 
Charter of the United Nations 1945, art 1(3). - To achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
36 Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, (n 12) 21.  
37 G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (n 2) 27. 
38 ibid. 
39 David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (1992) 23 (2) University of 
Toledo Law Review, 253, 259. 
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relation to humanitarian interventions, the opponents to the doctrine point towards the 
prohibition on the use of force in the Charter to put an end to any debate which aims at 
reconciling the doctrine and the UN jus ad bellum regime.40 Note that, under Article 2 
paragraph 4 of the Charter of the UN, “all members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”41 In addition, Article 2 paragraph 7 declares that, “nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”42 However, according to those in 
support of the doctrine, Article 2(4) of the Charter does not completely forbid the threat or 
the use of force. It only does so, in cases, where such use of force is directed against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.43 Besides, Article 2(4) does not 
prohibit humanitarian intervention, given that, in principle, humanitarian interventions are 
neither directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.44  
As per Philip Jessup, former judge at the International Court of Justice: “if force can be used 
in a manner which does not threaten the territorial integrity nor political independence of a 
state, it escapes the restriction of the fist clause.”45 Additionally, it is argued that 
humanitarian interventions only cement the core values (for example, fundamental human 
rights, maintaining international peace and security) that led to the formation of the United 
Nations.46 Yet, others argue that, the phrase ‘against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state’ suggests a sweeping ban on the use of force in order to protect 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
40 ibid 260-261. 
41 Charter of the United Nations 1945, art 2(4). 
42 Charter of the United Nations 1945, art 2(7). 
43 Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World (n 6) 10.    
44 Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends? (2009) 91 (876) International Review of 
the Red Cross 803, 823. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid 824. 
10 
 
smaller/weak states against aggression.47 Nonetheless, the legality of use of force in 
humanitarian interventions in the UN era cannot solely be based upon the interpretation of 
Article 2(4). Application of Charter provisions need to balance out textual connotations, 
contemporary challenges and state practice in order to decide upon the legality or illegality of 
any action.48  
Note that, since the 1990s, a number of humanitarian interventions have occurred. In 
analyzing some of these interventions the following section attempts to highlight the role of 
the UN Security Council and its resolutions in the development and debate of the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine. The purpose behind the examination of these specific 
cases of intervention is to firstly, identify when the international community has been willing 
to take up arms for humanitarian considerations and secondly, to examine the particular legal 
issues involved in each intervention that help shape the discourse on humanitarian 
intervention today.  
 
4. Humanitarian Intervention in Practice 
A. Northern Iraq, 1991 
Saddam Hussein carried out a campaign of repression against the Kurdish population 
following the 1991 Gulf War. Fearing the worst, many Kurds sought refuge in the 
mountainous borders of Turkey and Iran. The Iraqi forces even cut-off access to basic 
necessities which led to thousands Kurds dying daily from appalling health conditions and 
lack of food.49  
                                                             
47 Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World (n 6) 12. - The International 
Court of Justice in Nicaragua v United States held that, while the United States might form its own appraisal of 
the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to 
monitor or ensure such respect. 
48 ibid. 
49 Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War (1991) 
2 (2) European Journal of International Law, 114, 114. 
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The question before the Security Council was how to respond to violations of humanitarian 
and human rights law by Saddam’s regime. However, the Council’s only response to the 
situation came in the form of Resolution 688 which only condemned Saddam’s actions as UN 
members were not in favour of taking any military action in Iraq under humanitarian 
justifications.50 But, only weeks into Resolution 688, a coalition of military forces consisting 
of United States of America, British, and French troops, began to establish ‘safe havens’ in 
northern Iraq for protecting Kurdish refugees without the consent of Iraq.51 The ‘safe havens’ 
did initially prove to be useful in supplying much needed humanitarian relief to the Kurdish 
refugees, but ensuring their safe return home proved to be a lot more difficult for the 
coalition. Further, in addition to sending ground troops, the coalition also brought 
considerable air support and even established a no-fly zone for Iraqi aircrafts.52 Though, the 
Kurdish intervention did show support towards humanitarianism, yet, much cannot be said 
about the legality of the intervention or its contribution to the development of customary 
international law.53 The issue pertaining to the overall acceptance and legitimacy of the 
operation can be understood in the context of Security Council negotiations in relation to the 
situation in northern Iraq. Note that, during the debates over Resolution 688, there was no 
mention at all of the use of force against Iraq.54 With regard to the legal basis for 
intervention, a simple reading of Resolution 688 reveals that the intervention was not 
endorsed by the UN.55 Despite the fact that the coalition forces did intervene mainly to 
provide humanitarian relief to the Kurdish people in northern Iraq and saved at least few 
lives, the legality and legitimacy of the intervention remains a weak case.56 
 
                                                             
50 ibid 115. 
51 ibid. 
52 Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World (n 6) 39. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid 40. 
56 ibid 41. 
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B. Rwanda, 1994 
The Rwandan genocide was the result of years of tension and conflict between two ethnic 
groups in Rwanda: the Hutu and the Tutsi.57 The genocide was carried out by the Hutu 
Rwandan army and party militias concentrating on the mass elimination of all Tutsi. In the 
100 day period starting from April 7, 1994, an estimated 800,000 men, women, and children 
were killed.58 
Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, all 
parties to the Convention are obligated to prevent or punish acts of genocide.59 As early as 
August 1993, the international community was made aware of the genocide in Rwanda and 
that it met the Convention’s definition of genocide, yet, weeks into the genocide, the 
international community did nothing to stop the killings and wasted precious time in debating 
whether the killings met the legal definition of ‘genocide’ under the Convention.60 No 
military action was taken in the midst of gross violations of human rights by the international 
community. More shocking was the misuse of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the genocide.61 Note that, under the Arusha Peace Agreement, 
UNAMIR had been in Rwanda since October 1993 to oversee its implementation. However, 
the UN mission was forbidden to use force. UNAMIR’s commander, General Romeo 
Dallaire’s request of engaging with the Hutu’s to save innocent civilians was hence turned 
down by the UN. This was followed by the Security Council’s vote to reduce the size of 
UNAMIR to just 250 men.62 “The mass reduction of UNAMIR military forces, coupled with 
                                                             
57‘Outreach Programme on The Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations’ (United Nations) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml> accessed 13 March 2017.  
58 Organization of African Unity [OAU], “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide,” (African Union, 2000) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d1da8752.html> accessed 13 March 2017. 
59 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. 
60 Matthew P. Farrell, Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide: Nothing More Than a “Band-Aid 
Solution” (2013) 6 Glendon Journal of International Studies 1, 7. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid 8. 
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its passive Rules of Engagement signified that the international community had essentially 
decided against providing humanitarian military intervention.”63  
 
C. Kosovo, 1999 
The long-standing conflict between Serbs and Kosovars (ethnic Albanians) over Kosovo took 
a big turn in the late 1990s when war broke out between Serb forces and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) in February 1998. By the summer of 1998, the Serbs responded 
oppressively in Kosovo. Villages were burned and thousands of Kosovars were driven from 
their homes. According to an estimate by the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, 200,000 - 300,000 people were driven from their homes by the Serbs. The conflict 
continued to escalate and created a humanitarian disaster threatening destabilization in 
Macedonia and Albania, where most of the refugees had fled.64  
The United Nations was not involved in most of the key decisions regarding an international 
intervention on behalf of the Kosovars. Nonetheless, the Security Council did pass few 
resolutions (1160, 1199 and 1203) during the intervention which only condemned both sides 
for the conflict and hoped for a diplomatic solution.65 The military response by the North 
Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 
March 24, 1999, however, aroused more controversy than any use of force since the end of 
the Cold War. Though, NATO’s intervention was effective in stopping the persecution of 
Kosovo Albanians but it also involved the large scale use of force against a state, not because 
of its aggression against other states but because of the manner in which it was treating its 
                                                             
63 ibid. 
64 Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World (n 6) 42. 
65 David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law (2001) 25 (1) Fordham International Law 
Journal, 128, 133. See also, J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 49. 
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own citizens.66 It is also crucial to understand that, the Kosovo intervention was not carried 
out in vacuum but the primary impetus for using military force was to stop human rights 
violation. The US position on the Kosovo incident confirms the same.67 The statement made 
by President Bill Clinton which later came to be known as ‘Clinton Doctrine’ on 
humanitarian intervention is as follows: “It is not free of danger, it will not be free of 
difficulty. There will be some days you wish you were somewhere else. But never forget if 
we can do this here, and if we can say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa 
or Central Europe, or any other place, if anybody comes after innocent civilians and tries to 
kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it’s 
within our power to stop it, we will stop it.”68  
Although, the humanitarian enthusiasm was evident on part of NATO, there are problems 
with regard to the intervention’s authorization and character. Firstly, NATO undercut the 
Security Council’s power to determine whether the situation in Kosovo presented a threat to 
international peace and security. Note that, none of the Security Council resolutions had used 
the phrase ‘threat to international peace and security’.69 Additionally, “the lack of a broad 
international consensus concerning the Kosovo intervention shows that Kosovo did not meet 
the state practice requirement, and weakens any claims that the Kosovo situation be used as 
precedent for legalizing future interventions.”70 The NATO intervention was important in 
indicating that certain powerful states were willing to use force outside of the UN 
authorization in order to defend human rights anywhere. The problem, however, with the 
intervention only came in the manner in which it was conducted and justified. 
                                                             
66 Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo (1st edn, Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 2002) 144. 
67 Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm (2002) 13 (3) 
European Journal of International Law, 597, 598. 
68 ibid. 
69  John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (2001) 33 (1) Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, 111, 144.  




D. Libya, 2011 
While Kosovo signified progress in the evolution of humanitarian intervention regarding the 
use of force, the intervention in Libya in 2011 resulted in a step backward. The UN’s decision 
to intervene in Libya was in response to a civil war wherein rebels sought to overthrow the 
Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. However, the purpose for intervention in Libya appeared to 
soon shift from being humanitarian in nature to that of a regime change.71  
On March 17, 2011, the Security Council issued Resolution 1973, which demanded a 
“complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses, of civilians.”72 Further, this 
resolution authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, in addition to enforcement 
of a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. The resolution noted the “heavy civilian casualties, 
condemned the gross and systematic violation of human rights,” and labeled certain 
“widespread and systematic attacks” against civilians as “crimes against humanity.”73 It was 
clear that, the UN resolution contemplated humanitarian intervention as the legal basis for 
authorizing the use of force. But, what began as a humanitarian mission soon turned into 
providing air force support for the Libyan rebels and the bombing of targets throughout 
Libya. As a result, the intervention lost its humanitarian objective.74 A close examination of 
the resolution also shows that the military intervention in Libya was not the result of a 
unanimous agreement in the Security Council. Both, Russia and China had abstained from 
Resolution 1973.75  
In the above mentioned cases, a broad range of circumstances have had their influence on the 
legality and legitimacy of each intervention. Further, these cases have also shown when and 
                                                             
71 G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (n 2) 73-74. 
72‘Resolution 1973’ (United Nations) 
<http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf> 
accessed 13 March 2017. 
73 ibid. 




how humanitarian interventions should proceed. With respect to when can interventions 
occur, there is a genuine concern that a right to intervene can be abused by powerful states 
which could result in greater occurrences of violence and suffering. Contrasting with these 
views are persistent worries that inaction, resulting through selecting of missions, may also 
undermine humanitarian goals. In short, the most important question that needs to be asked 
is, what exactly constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and how often are 
states ready to rescue strangers? 
5. Towards New Humanitarianism post Syria? 
“More than 250,000 Syrians have lost their lives in four-and-a-half years of armed conflict, 
which began with anti-government protests before escalating into a full scale civil war. More 
than 11 million others have been forced from their homes as forces loyal to President Bashar 
al-Assad and those opposed to his rule battle each other - as well as jihadist militants from so-
called Islamic State.”76 There is no doubt that, Syria’s case presents a challenge to the 
expansion of humanitarian intervention doctrine. The repeated failure on part of the 
international community to come together to rescue and implement civilian protection rules 
has also threatened the credibility of the UN.77 Nonetheless, the current situation in Syria and 
several other humanitarian missions of the past only bring back the focus on the most crucial 
part of the debate regarding the doctrine which is the decision to act in times of crisis.78 For 
this reason, there is a need to examine the phrase ‘the decision to act’ in light of new 
conflicts.  
Since the 1990s, there has been a decrease in state versus state conflicts due an upsurge in 
violence within states. However, for civilians who end up suffering every time, the nature of 
                                                             
76 ‘Syria: The story of the conflict’ (BBC, 11 March 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
26116868> accessed 13 March 2017. 
77 Eric Engle, Humanitarian Intervention and Syria (2012) 18 (1) Barry Law Review, 129, 130. 
78 William D. Wood, Humanitarian Intervention in Syria: Is crisis response and limited contingency operations 
the solution? (2015) 223 (3) Military Law Review, 610, 628. 
17 
 
conflict has rarely made a difference. These new conflicts are fought locally in 
neighborhoods; villages etc. and they often give rise to grave humanitarian catastrophes 
which are characterized by massive bloodshed, displacement, malnutrition and starvation.79 
For example, “in Rwanda, some 800,000 people (a tenth of the total population) were 
slaughtered in a period of few weeks, while as many as 250,000-500,000 women were raped, 
and half the population forcibly displaced; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were some 100,000 
deaths, with 20,000-50,000 rapes and 2.7 million people left in need of assistance and 1.5 
million risked starvation.”80 Note that, these disasters do pose a considerable quantitative and 
qualitative challenge for those seeking to come to the rescue, be it soldiers or civilian 
humanitarians.  
In light of today’s civil wars, the traditional humanitarian thinking may appear to be 
ineffective because it is based upon principles and assumptions, which have certainly worked 
well in the era of interstate wars but are undoubtedly of less help in tackling present day 
crisis. Therefore, an examination of this dramatic shift away from a state centric 
understanding of international relations becomes all the more essential in order to assess 
humanitarian interventions today.81 The most striking feature of this shift is the rise of non-
state actors who have usurped the role of states due to an absence or failure of political 
institutions. Further, failure to respect international humanitarian law, attack on aid 
personnel, blocking of relief, scale of human suffering etc. have raised doubts over the 
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traditional operating principles of humanitarian intervention.82 According to the April 2011 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report, To Stay and Deliver, “the 
number of attacks against aid workers actually tripled over the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, resulting in an average of more than 100 death per year. War-torn Afghanistan, 
Somalia and Sudan were the most dangerous, with fatalities in these countries inflating global 
trends.”83 UN organizations as well as non-governmental organizations have always had to 
work with states authorities, in order to find victims and provide relief in war affected areas. 
In some ways, humanitarian space was always guaranteed by states in many interstate wars 
wherein aid workers could carry out their relief work.84 But in most of the new conflicts, 
belligerents often do not provide consent, allow passage of relief or abide by international 
law. Hence, the most basic struggle for aid workers today is to secure humanitarian space, a 
challenge not known to them earlier.85  
On the other hand, the use of military force is also considered problematic and only few 
states go for making such a commitment because of an expansion of humanitarian work 
which now includes “development, democracy promotion, establishing the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, and post-conflict peace building.”86 An argument against the use of 
military force in humanitarian missions is that “any deployment of soldiers is bound to clash 
with humanitarian principles of independent, neutral and impartial provision of relief of 
victims of conflict. As such, relief oriented actor’s who dishonor that definition are on a 
slippery slope to a kind of corruption.”87 Again, there is also the debate regarding whether the 
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use of military force does more harm than good.88 Further, there are significant quantitative 
problems via a vis the actual measurement of costs and benefits, for example, how feasible is 
placing soldiers on the ground for protecting civilians in a foreign territory considering the 
casualties, fatalities and the political impact.89 Nonetheless, whatever the costs and benefits 
affecting humanitarian missions; it appears that politics and military capacity in the end are 
more vital in determining when, where, why and how to protect and assist affected population 
during conflicts.  
Conclusion 
The international community’s inaction is largely to be blamed for the current situation in 
Syria, yet, despite the political deadlock in the Security Council; it would be too early to say 
that states are now slowly rejecting the idea of humanitarian interventions. However, each 
unfolding episode of crisis, points towards the difficulty of getting a general answer on the 
question of whether or not one should go for humanitarian intervention. As already noted in 
the paper, the answer to the question of whether or not in a particular scenario, humanitarian 
intervention is viewed legal is likely to depend not only on the circumstances of the case, but 
also on the perspectives and interests of the states addressing the matter. 
Setting aside the issues raised in this paper for a moment, what remains clear is that the 
nature of war is undergoing transformations which do require transformation in 
humanitarianism. In light of the events post 1990s, there is no blueprint for humanitarian 
interventions as of today to overcome the challenges posed by these transformations, 
however, in the opinion of the author’s,  human rights violations must continue to command 
attention of the world; at the same time, addressing of new issues affecting humanitarian 
interventions must not be overlooked. A cautious legal regulation is required to mitigate the 
problems. This would depend on firstly, a reassessment of fundamental principles of 





contemporary international law, i.e. respect for human rights versus the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention and secondly, establishing an effective human rights 
protection mechanism to combat grave and massive violations of human rights which will act 



























 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), I.C.J. Reports 1949. 
Legal Instruments 
 Charter of the United Nations 1945. 
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. 
 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933. 
 
Books 
 Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo (1st edn, 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2002). 
 J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 Kalevi J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2004). 
 Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones and Janice Gross Stein, “Mean Times”: 
Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies - Stark Choices, Cruel 
Dilemmas (Programme on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Centre for 
International Studies, University of Toronto 1999). 
 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (3rd edn, Polity Press 2016). 
Articles 
 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights (1993) 
69 (3) International Affairs. 
 Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, (2000) 3 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 
 Bruce M. Oswald, The Creation and Control of Places of Protection during United 
Nations Peace Operations (2001) 83 (844) International Review of the Red Cross. 
 Celeste Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary Interpretation of the 




 Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive 
Paradigm (2002) 13 (3) European Journal of International Law. 
 Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention (1988) 9 Michigan Yearbook of International 
Legal Studies.  
 David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (1992) 23 
(2) University of Toledo Law Review. 
 David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect 
World (2003) 18 (1) Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law.    
 David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law (2001) 25 (1) Fordham 
International Law Journal.  
 Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian 
Project (2004) 35 (2) Columbia Human Rights Law Review. 
 Dr. Jasmeet Gulati and Ivan Khosa, Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State 
Sovereignty (2013) 41 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy. 
 Eric Engle, Humanitarian Intervention and Syria (2012) 18 (1) Barry Law Review. 
 Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for 
humanitarian ends? (2009) 91 (876) International Review of the Red Cross. 
 Gabor Sulyok, Humanitarian Intervention: A Historical and Theoretical Overview 
(2000) 41 (1-2) Acta Juridica Hungarica. 
 Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect (2006) 
24 (3) Wisconsin International Law Journal. 
 Graham Cronogue, Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention Post – Libya (2012) 3 (1) Journal of International 
Humanitarian Legal Studies.  
 J. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention 
(1974) 4 California Western International Law Journal.  
 John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (2001) 33 (1) 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law.  
 Mark S. Stein, Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention (2004) 16 (2) Social 
Philosophy and Policy. 
23 
 
 Matthew P. Farrell, Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide: Nothing 
More Than a “Band-Aid Solution” (2013) 6 Glendon Journal of International Studies. 
 Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the 
Second Gulf War (1991) 2 (2) European Journal of International Law. 
 Rohini Sen, Use of Force and the ‘Humanitarian’ Face of Intervention in the 21st 
Century (2014) 32 (3) Wisconsin International Law Journal.  
 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, (2006) 100 (1) The 
American Journal of International Law. 
 S. G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention (1993) 24 
California Western International Law Journal. 
 William D. Wood, Humanitarian Intervention in Syria: Is crisis response and limited 
contingency operations the solution? (2015) 223 (3) Military Law Review. 




 ‘Outreach Programme on The Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations’ (United 
Nations) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml> 
accessed 13 March 2017.  
 ‘Resolution 1973’ (United Nations) 
<http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-
UNSCR-1973.pdf> accessed 13 March 2017. 
 ‘Syria: The story of the conflict’ (BBC, 11 March 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868> accessed 13 March 2017. 
 Anne Ryniker, ‘The ICRC position on “humanitarian intervention”’ (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, June 2001), 527 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/527-532_ryniker-ang.pdf> accessed 7 
March 2017. 
 Organization of African Unity [OAU], “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide,” 
(African Union, 2000) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d1da8752.html> 
accessed 13 March 2017. 
24 
 
 Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly’ (United Nations, 
20 September 1999) <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html> 
accessed 7 March 2017.  
 
